



EXHIBIT 7



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of Active Voters: 76,801

of Election Day Polling Places: 17

of Advance Voting Locations: 4

What is the goal?

- To verify that we did not declare the wrong winner because of a voting system error.
- The best way to do this is to compare the text that the voter verified on their ballot to the results reported by the voting system.
- L&A Testing is important but does not replace a tabulation audit.



A few notes...

- “Hand Recounts” do not exist in Georgia except for when the central scanner fails the initial test during the recount process.
- “Forensic Audit” is an extraordinarily vague term, and that is not what we are talking about today.
- You cannot audit “voter intent.”
- Terminology is important when describing audits so use the right words. It’s already hard enough to educate voters on what’s going on.



Definitions

- **Canvassing** – the process for ensuring all (and only) legal votes are included in the official results.
- **Tabulation Audit** – the process that occurs after the canvas to ensure that the voting system tabulated the votes correctly.
- **Risk Limiting Audits** – A form of tabulation audit that provides strong statistical evidence that we did not declare the wrong winner.
 - *Batch*
 - *Ballot Comparison*
 - *Polling*





Recounts Vs. Audits

Audits

- Cannot be legally requested, are required in certain elections, and can always be voluntarily performed.
- Do not change the results or outcome but can spark a recount.
- Performed by hand independently of the voting system so we expect the results to be a little off.
- Goal: Confirming we didn't declare the wrong winner.

Recounts

- May be requested by a losing candidate in certain circumstances.
- Can (and often does) change the reported results if not the outcome.
- Is done using ballot scanners rather than by hand counting.
- Goal: Changing the outcome of the election.



Georgia Law

§ 21-2-498. Precertification tabulation audits; rules and regulations; risk-limiting audit pilot program

(a) As used in this Code section, the term:

- (1) “Incorrect outcome” is when the winner of a contest or the answer to a proposed constitutional amendment or question would be different from the results found in a manual recount of paper official ballots.
- (2) “Risk limit” means the largest statistical probability that an incorrect outcome is not detected or corrected in a risk-limiting audit.
- (3) “Risk-limiting audit” means an audit protocol that makes use of statistical methods and is designed to limit to acceptable levels the risk of certifying a preliminary election outcome that constitutes an incorrect outcome.

(b) As soon as possible, but no later than the November, 2020, general election, the local election superintendents shall conduct precertification tabulation audits for any federal or state general election in accordance with requirements set forth by rule or regulation of the State Election Board. Audits performed under this Code section shall be conducted by manual inspection of random samples of the paper official ballots.

(c) In conducting each audit, the local election superintendents shall:

- (1) Complete the audit prior to final certification of the contest;
- (2) Ensure that all types of ballots are included in the audit, whether cast in person, by absentee ballot, advance voting, provisional ballot, or otherwise;
- (3) Provide a report of the unofficial final tabulated vote results for the contest to the public prior to conducting the audit;
- (4) Complete the audit in public view; and
- (5) Provide details of the audit to the public within 48 hours of completion.



Georgia Law

- (d) The State Election Board shall be authorized to promulgate rules, regulations, and procedures to implement and administer the provisions of this Code section. The procedures prescribed by the State Election Board shall include security procedures to ensure that collection of validly cast ballots is complete, accurate, and trustworthy throughout the audit.
- (e) The Secretary of State shall conduct a risk-limiting audit pilot program with a risk limit of not greater than 10 percent in one or more counties by December 31, 2021. The Secretary of State shall review the results of the pilot program and, within 90 days following the election in which such pilot program is used, shall provide the members of the General Assembly with a comprehensive report, including a plan on how to implement risk-limiting audits state wide. If such risk-limiting audit is successful in achieving the specified confidence level within five business days following the election for which it was conducted, then all audits performed pursuant to this Code section shall be similarly conducted, beginning not later than November 1, 2024.



Georgia Rule

183-1-15-.04. Audit.

(1) Preparing for the Audit

1. Following November general elections in even-numbered years, each county shall participate in a statewide risk-limiting audit with a risk limit of not greater than 10 percent as set forth in this rule prior to the certification by the Secretary of State.
2. Prior to county certification, the election superintendent of each county shall prepare a ballot manifest as instructed by the Secretary of State.
3. The contest to audit shall be selected by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State shall set a date, time, and location after the November general election in even-numbered years to select which contest to audit. Such meeting shall be open to the public. After selecting the contest to audit, the Secretary of State shall publicly announce which contest will be audited and publish the selected contest on the Secretary of State webpage. In selecting the contest to audit, the Secretary of State shall consider the below criteria:
 - a. The closeness of the reported tabulation outcomes;
 - b. The geographical scope of the contests;
 - c. The number of ballots counted in the contests;
 - d. Any cause for concern regarding the accuracy of the reported tabulation outcome of the contests;
 - e. Any other benefits that may result from auditing certain contests; or
 - f. The ability of the county to complete the audit before the state certification deadline.
4. The audit shall be open to the public, and public notice of the date, time, and location of the audit must be posted on the county election office's website, or, if the county election's office does not have a website, in another prominent location.



Georgia Rule

(2) Conducting the Audit

1. The audit shall be open to the view of the public and press, but no person except the person(s) designated by the election superintendent or the superintendent's authorized deputy shall touch any ballot or ballot container. The election superintendent may designate a viewing area from which members of the public may observe the audit for the purpose of good order and maintaining the integrity of the audit.
2. The election superintendent shall create audit teams comprised of at least two sworn designees to assist with the audit. The superintendent may designate non-employees to assist with the audit process. All persons who the superintendent designates to assist with the audit shall take and sign an oath that they will conduct the audit accurately and securely prior to assisting with the audit.
3. Chain of custody for each ballot shall be maintained at all times during the audit, including but not limited to, a log of the seal numbers on the ballot containers before and after completing the manual audit.
4. For ballots marked by electronic ballot markers, the auditors shall rely on the printed text on the ballot to determine the voter's selection. For ballots marked by hand, the auditors shall rely on the choices indicated by the voter by filling in the oval adjacent to the candidate or question.
5. The audit shall end once all selected ballots have been counted and the risk limit for the audit has been met.
6. The election superintendent shall report the results of the audit to the Secretary of State.
7. The election superintendent shall follow instructions issued by the Secretary of State on how to specifically conduct the audit, including but not limited to setting deadlines and formats for creating ballot manifests.



Voluntary Vs. Statutory Audits

- **Statutory**

- Must be completed before the SOS can certify the Election.
- Required for any State or Federal General Election.
- The SOS chooses the race to be audited as well as the method and timeframe for the audit.

- **Voluntary**

- Must be completed before ballots are given to Clerk of Court (with proper notice to SOS).
- Not required, but sure are a good idea.
- Allow the county to select the race(s) to be audited, as well as the method and timeframe.



Ballot Storage and Accounting

- This should be a continuous effort from the time you accept your first ballot until the time you pack your ballots to turn in to the Clerk of Court (even if you don't plan to do an audit).
- Voted (and opened) ballots should always be sealed and secured when not in use, and you must maintain a log for every container to track Chain of Custody.



Ballot Storage and Accounting

- At any given moment you should be able to easily determine:
 - How many ballots are in each storage container
 - If the chain of custody for that container is intact
- Always store ballots by tabulator
 - You can have multiple containers per tabulator, but not multiple tabulators per container
 - Remember that a precinct can have multiple tabulators; do not mix them.





Ballot Storage and Accounting

- Use the forms and reports you already generate to assist you with this:
 - Recap Forms
 - Ballot Recap
 - Scanner Ballot Box Recap
 - Etc.
 - Seal Logs



Ballot Manifest

- This is arguably the most important step in preparing for an audit.
- You can start creating it as soon as you know the final number of ballots in any given container but has to be completed before the start of the audit.
- A complete listing of every ballot storage container that includes:
 - The container name
 - The tabulator that counted the ballots in that container
 - How many ballots are in the container
 - The seal(s) currently securing the container
- This is easy if you kept good records throughout the process.



Audit Preparation

Facility

- Need a location big enough for ballot storage, auditing teams, monitors, and public observation.
- Ideally everything should be in one room and visible to everyone in the room.
- Must be appropriately secured when not in use.

Advertising

- By law, it must be advertised as soon as possible (but before the beginning of audit) on the county website or alternative.
- The advertisement must include the date, time, and location for the audit.



Audit Preparation

Staffing

- You can use employees or volunteers.
- Auditors should be detail oriented and able to sit for long periods of time.
- Poll Managers and Assistant Managers work well.

Monitors

- It's critically important that audits are observed.
- Monitors should be able to see the entire process, but not necessarily the contents of the ballots.
- Be sure to educate your monitors and make them feel appreciated.



Audit Preparation

Chain of Custody

- There should be a record anytime ballots are relocated from one location or container to another.
- Logs or forms are used for this purpose.
- This continues through the conclusion of your audit until the ballots are turned over to the Clerk of Court.
- Ballots should NEVER be left unsealed or unsecured.

Supplies

- Depends on type of audit
- In general:
 - Security Supplies – seals and CoC paperwork
 - Auditing Supplies – tally sheets, name badges, oaths, etc.
 - Transparency Supplies – signs, PPE, oaths



Audit Roles

- **Supervisor** – The person who oversees the audit at that location. Similar to a Poll Manager.
- **Librarians** – Employees who are responsible for checking ballots in and out of the secure storage location.
- **Auditors** – Employees or volunteers who are responsible for examining and counting each ballot to be audited. They normally work in teams of 2.
- **Monitors** – Official observers appointed by candidates or political parties. Their role is to observe the process, but not necessarily to examine every ballot that is being audited.
- **Ballot Review Team** – Responsible for determining voter intent when necessary (overvotes, stray/ambiguous marks, duplicated ballots). Composed of an election official and a representative of each political party in a partisan race, or two monitors in nonpartisan race.



Audit Roles

- **Observers** – Members of the public that are there to observe in an unofficial capacity. They should have an area to observe from where they can see what's going on without the ability to interfere
- **Security / Bailiff** - Someone who is empowered to enforce the rules of the audit, prevent intimidation, and generally keep the peace. *Note: It's as important to enforce the rules on the auditors and librarians as it is to enforce them on the monitors and observers.*
- **Media** – The law is silent on this, but the entire point of the audit is to give the public confidence that their vote was tabulated properly. A nice story in the local paper really helps with that.



Training

- Train your auditors at the beginning of the audit (or one step at a time).
- Training should include:
 - The audit process
 - How the auditors will record their findings and how they should ask for help or clarification.
 - The rules for your location (who can handle what, what monitors are allowed to observe, how the monitors should report concerns, food and drinks, bathroom breaks, etc.)
- Keep your training as simple as possible and do it on site in front of the monitors and public.
- Retain your training materials as part of the record of the audit.



Public Observation

- Make sure the monitors and public observers not only can see what's happening but are educated on the process.
- Live streaming the audit can help with transparency, but also allows someone watching to create their own narrative.
- The bottom line is that you want to make the audit as observable as you can, without losing control. For example - there is no requirement for the monitors to see the tally sheets, but it's a good idea to allow them to record that information while the audit is ongoing.



Maintaining Order

- Audits can be confrontational, and that's OK.
- Monitors and observers may feel obligated to be forceful in their reporting of what they see as problems. The easiest way to prevent this is to be proactive and educate them.
- This does not excuse hateful or threatening behavior, but you have to decide where that line falls and what the appropriate response is.
- Be clear on what is expected of both the auditors, monitors, and observers and have someone on hand to enforce those rules.
- Posting the rules on signs seems to help as well.





The Process



After the Audit

- Release the initial results as soon as possible
- Consider investigating errors if needed but remember that perfection is usually not an attainable goal (and that's ok).
- Be clear in your messaging and issue a statement explaining the results of the audit.

??? QUESTIONS ???

GAVREO Conference August 2021

